Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Reed v. Forrer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George E. Mangan, James R. Hall; attorneys for appellants.
R. Clark Arnold; Reynolds & Arnold; attorneys for respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Stuart Reed v. Henry H. Forrer, No. 914572.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3849

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

BRIEF

KFU
45.9
.59
DOCKET NO.

'HE STATlE OF UTAH

^£7>/?

1.JUN1977
XSITY

Plaintiff
Case No. 14572

-vsSTUART REED, RUSSELL REED, DONALD
REED, FRANKLIN REED, MARGARET REED
CORDIE MAE REED and LAWANNA KAY
REED,
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs
-vsHENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT SATHER,
EZILDA HENDRICKS, CHARLES HENDRICKS
ROGER L. ROBERSON and ETHEL
LaVERNIA ROBERSON,
Counter-Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
The Honorable George E. Baillif, Judge
GEORGE E. MANGAN
P. 0. Box 246
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Attorney for Henry H. Forrer,
Roger L. ROberson and Ethel
LaVernia ROberson,
Counter-Defendants and Appellants
JAMES R. HALt
P. P. Box 39$
Roosevelt, uiah 84066
Attorney for Robert Sather,
Counter-Defendant and Appellant
R. CLARK ARNOLD
318 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendants and
Counter-Plaintiffs

FILED
JUL 3 0 1976
C V k , SupracM Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 6 F UTAH
HENRY H. FORRER,
Plaintiff
Case No. 14572

-vsSTUART REED, RUSSELL REED, DONALD
REED, FRANKLIN REED, MARGARET REED
CORDIE MAE REED and LAWANNA KAY
REED,
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs
-vsHENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT SATHER,
EZILDA HENDRICKS, CHARLES HENDRICKS
ROGER L. ROBERSON and ETHEL
LaVERNIA ROBERSON,
Counter-Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court
Uintah County, State of Utah
The Honorable George E. Baillif, IJudge
GEORGE E. MANG4N
P. O. Box 246
Roosevelt, Utah[ 84066
Attorney for Henry H. Forrer,
Roger L. Rob^rson and Ethel
LaVernia Rob ersson,
Counter-•Deferidant s and Appellants
JAMES R. HALL
P. P. Box 395
Roosevelt, Utah| 84066
Attorney for Robert Sather,
Counter-Defendant and Appellant
R. CLARK ARNOLD
318 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Defendants and
Counter-Plaintiffs

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. . .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

....

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I.

POINT II

THE DEFENDANTS' MORTGAGEE ON THE
PROPERTY IN QUESTION WAS NEVER A
VALID LIEN

3

THE SUBJECT MORTGAGE WAS NOT TIMELY
FORECLOSED

5

POINT III.

THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE OR FORECLOSE THE
MORTGAGE IN QUESTION WA$ EXTINGUISHED
OR BARRED BY THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTES
OF LIMITATIONS . . . .

POINT IV

THE INTEREST OF EACH OF| THE DEFENDANTS
IN AND TO THE MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SEVERED OR SEVERABLE .
15

CONCLUSION.

18
CASES CITED

Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague,
246 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. 27

L

5

Striker v. Rasch,
57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 113 P.2d 963

5

Cummings v. Nielson,
42 Utah 157, 129 P.619, 622

5

Christensen v. Christensen,
339 P2d 101, 1959

\
4

5

Frailey v. McGarry,
1949, 116 Utah 504, 211 P. 2d 840 . . .,

6

Jenkins v. Jensen
24 Utah 108, 66 P. 773

7

Hill, Trustees,
267, 403, 504

H

7

Dignan, et al v. Nelson, et al,
26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936

8

Parr v. Zions First National Bank,
13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P2d 461.

8

Krompton v. Jensen,
78 Utah 55, 65, IP. 2d 242

12

Boucofski v. Jacobson,
36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117

12

Graves v. Seifried,
3T~Utah 203, 87 P. 674

. . . .

12

Brandstein v. Johnson,
140 Cal. 229, 73 Pac. 744

14

Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co.
95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471

14

Baker v. Goodman,
57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117

16

STATUTES CITED
Title 57-1-6, U.C.A

4

Title 75-13-14, U.C.A

10

Rule 3 U.R.C.P

."" . . • •

Title 78-12-18 and 75-13-14 U.C.A

11-12
15

AUTHORITIES CITED
55 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 364

5

53 ALR 610

5

136 ALR 770

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HENRY H. FORRER,
Plaintiff
Case No. 14572

-vsSTUART REED, RUSSELL REED, DONALD
REED, FRANKLIN REED, MARGARET REED
CORDIE MAE REED and LAWANNA KAY
REED,
Defendants and Counter-Plaintiffs
-vsHENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT SATHER,
EZILDA HENDRICKS, CHARLES HENDRICKS
ROGER L. ROBERSON and ETHEL
LaVERNIA ROBERSON,
Counter-Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS f BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The plaintiff brought an action in the lower court to
determine the validity of a mortgage in favor of the defendants
and to quiet title in and to the following described real property
in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit:
TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN
Section 35:

The East half of the Southeast quarter of the
Northwest quarter; the West half of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter;

(hereinafter referred to as subject property).
The defendants initially answered by asserting the validity
of their mortgage and thereafter counterclaimed in the alternative for the foreclosure of their mortgage, or for the court

- 2 to determine that they were the rightful owners of said property.
The defendants also cross-claimed against other persons who were
made parties to the action.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court decreed that the plaintiff was the legal
owner of the subject property, but that the property was subject
to a valid mortgage in favor of the defendants in the amount of
$15,750.00.

Defendants were granted a judgment against Ezilda

Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks, counter-defendants, for
$15,750.00, plus $25.60 in court costs and interest at the rate
of eight (8%) percent per annum from the date of entry of judgment until paid, together with a decree of foreclosure of the
defendants1 mortgage, thereby selling the subject property to
satisfy the indebtedness of the Hendricks to the defendants.

The

court also entered the default of the defendants, Stuart Reed,
Russell Reed, and Donald Reed, who did not appear in the matter,
to answer plaintiff's complaint.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff, Henry Forrer, and counter-defendants, Robert
Sather, Roger Roberson and Ethel LaVerna Roberson, desire this
court to reverse the decision of the trial court, granting the
defendants a decree of foreclosure against the subject property,
and to decree that by operation of law, the subject property is
free and clear of the mortgage to the defendants in the sum of
$15,750.00.

- 3 STATEMENT OF FACTS
The PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION of the pairties, which stipulation
is pages 95 through 100 of the transcript, contains a concise
statement of all the relevant facts as they existed prior to the
submission of the matter to the court.

This court is faced with

the determination of whether the lower court made the correct
application of the law to the stipulated! facts.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANTS1 MORTGAGE ON THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION
WAS NEVER A VALID LIEN.
While the pretrial order asserts thkt the mortgage is a
valid lien, the court, nevertheless, has to consider the legal
effects of the mortgage instrument that tLs in question.

It is

settled law that a person cannot give a valid mortgage to property that is not legally his.

By examining the exhibit entitled,

"Deed to Restricted Indian Land", it is fto be noted that said
deed is from Lily Reed Wash and Chalmers] Wash for the land in
question, to the "United States of Ameri ba in Trust for Ezilda
Reed Hendricks, an allotted Uintah Ute."

The fact is, that said

deed was not recorded in the records of Uintah County, and therefore, any alleged interest of Ezilda Reed Hendricks could not be
of record. Said restricted deed was given on the 4th of January,
^1954.

The patent in and to the property in question was not

issued by the United States Government until October, 1959, which
patent was not recorded until October 18 , 1966.

Thus, when

Ezilda Van Hendricks and Charles A. Hendjricks issued a mortgage

- 4to the defendants, namely, on December 19, 19 56, they had nothing
to mortgage.

There was no chain of title in and to the property

in question in the records of Uintah County in the name of either
Charles A. Hendricks or Ezilda Van Hendricks and in fact, the
only evidence of title in either of them was an unrecorded deed
to restricted Indian land wherein the United States of America
held title to said property as Trustee for Ezilda Reed Hendricks.
Apparently, on December 19, 1956, Ezilda Reed Hendricks was a
ward of the United States Government as were all other enrolled
members of the Ute Tribe.

But in any event, the fact is, there

was no property in the name of Ezilda Hendricks, nor did she have
legal title to this property, and therefore, she could not
mortgage the same to her children, the defendants.

It would thus

reasonably appear that the recording of the mortgage from Ezilda
Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks to the defendants herein
should be considered the same as a "stray" deed or mortgage.
Title 57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, requires the
recording of instruments in order to impart notice.

Since in

December, 1957, there was no recorded chain of title of the
property from the patentee or the United States Government to
Ezilda Van Hendricks, it would be reasonable for the ordinary and
prudent person to assume that there was no title in fact, in
Ezilda Van Hendricks, and that said mortgage was but a "stray"
mortgage.

This conclusion seems even the more reasonable since

there was no recorded patent or other activity in the office of
the county recorder relative to the land in question, except the

- 5 mortgage in question, until 1966, when the patent and a warranty
deed were recorded.

POINT II
THE SUBJECT MORTGAGE WAS NOT TIMELY FORECLOSED.
While the Utah courts have apparently not ruled specifically
on the question of the effect of the failure of the parties to
include a provision in the mortgage relative to the time for
repayment, the general rule, as stated ib 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Section
364, is as follows:
If a contract for the purchase! and sale of real
estate provides for mortgages pr specified amounts,
but is silent as to the date of maturity, it is
then held that the law will imbly maturity
on demand. (See Keystone Hard^ard Corp. v.
Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N. E. 127, 53 ALR 610).
(Emphasis Added).
It has also been held that where the record fails to disclose when an indebtedness secured by a mortgage was due, it must
be assumed that it was due at once or at least within a reasonable time.

(See Striker v. Rasch, 57 Wyb. 34, 112 P2d 570, 113

P2d 963, 136 ALR 770).

In a similar manner, this court has held:

"In view that the contract is jsilent as to time,
the law supplies the ommissionl by compelling the
appellants to act within a reasonable time. What
constitutes a reasonable time Would ordinarily be
a question of fact under all of the circumstances."
(Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622).
This court reiterated that principle in Christensen v
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P2d 101, 1959.
the court stated:

In that case,

- 6"No date was set for payment by the express
terms of the contract and although in cases of
this kind, the time of payment necessarily is implied
and calls for performance within the reasonable
time, under familiar equitable principles . . . "
(Pg. 104)
The court then cited the case of Frailey v. McGarry, 1949, 116
Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, which situation involved one party
giving the other party reasonable notice of the recision of a
contract because of fraud.

The court held in that case, that a

ten month delay after the default or misrepresentation was known,
was not reasonable notice.
The trial court was faced with the question of what is a
reasonable time within which to foreclose a mortgage that contains no due date and determined that an action commenced seventeen years after the giving of the mortgage which had no due
date, and more than three (3) years after the youngest minor had
reached her majority, was a reasonable length of time.
believe that said decision was incorrect.

Appellants

By its very nature,

the mortgage, if it was valid, is and was due upon demand and
should have been paid within a reasonable time after being executed. Appellants can see nothing reasonable about a mortgage
which was executed in 1956, being foreclosed in an action which
was commenced in 1973. Nevertheless, the question is, what is a
reasonable length of time after December, 1956, within which the
defendants should have foreclosed their mortgage?

Surely,

reasonable men should find that more than seventeen (17) years
is a reasonable time within which to foreclose the subject

- 7 mortgage.

Thus, the right to foreclose [the defendants' mortgage

should be denied for failing to timely floreclose the same.

POINT III
THE RIGHT TO ENFORCE OR FORECLOSE TlHE MORTGAGE IN
QUESTION WAS EXTINGUISHED OR BARREL BY THE RUNNING
OF THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
It is undisputed that on March 19, (1958, Ezilda Hendricks
was appointed as the guardian of each of her minor children, who
appeared, defended and counterclaimed ad defendants herein.

It

is also an undisputed fact that Ezilda Hendricks was never released as the guardian of those children and continued, therefore, to serve as their guardian until such time as they reached
their majority.

The appointment of Ezilda Hendricks, who is both

their mother and one of the mortgagors of the subject property,
as the guardian of the defendants, had a legal effect that was
apparently overlooked by the trial court, namely, that the
Statute of Limitations commenced running against the minor children as to any rights to foreclose their(mortgage, by reason of
the appointment of said guardian.
In Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P. 773, this court held:
"The general rule is that when a trustee is barred
by the Statute of Limitations] the cestqui que trust
is likewise barred, even though an infant (Hill,
Trustees, 267, 403, 504), andjthat the heir or
devisee is dependent upon the diligence of the
executor for the maintenance of his rights with
respect to the real property but is not without
remedy by an action for damages against his executor
and his sureties or by a proper proceeding to compel
him to bring suit ... Where the administrator in this
state neglects to bring an action to recover property
of the estate until it is barred under the Statute
of Limitations applicable to jhe subject, tihe heir

- 8 is also barred even though the heir be a minor at
the time the action accrues to the administrator,"
(At page 777). (Emphasis added)
"The administrator or trustee having the right
to commence suit for the recovery of the property
within the time limited by the statute and having
omitted to do so, he is barred from commencing such
action against the respondents who are strangers
to the estate and the beneficiary is also barred
and his only remedy, if any, would be against the
administrator and his sureties. " (At page 779)
(Emphasis added).
That rule of law was also followed by this court in the case
of Dignan et al, v. Nelson et al. 26 Utah 186, 72 P. 936, at
which time the court reiterated its decision in the Jenkins v.
Jensen and concluded by saying:
"Wei perceive no good reason to depart from the
doctrine of that case and must, therefore, regard
it as controlling authority on this point herein,
not withstanding the argument of counsel for the
appellants against its correctness. In this case
the plaintiff, Emma McGuile, was not only the
administrator of the testatefs estate, but was also
the guardian of the minor heirs, and hence, she as
their representative and trustee being barred as
we have seen, such heirs are likewise barred."
(Page 938) (Emphasis added)
In 19 62, this court reiterated the doctrine of the Jenkins
v. Jensen and the Dignan v. Nelson cases, when it held:
"The guardian had possession or the right to the
possession of their property for more than the required
seven years. In Dignan v. nelson, this court held
that where the Statutes of Limitations has run against
a guardian, the minor heirs are likewise barred,
just as we have held that when the administrator is
barred, the minor heirs of the decedent were barred
and for the same reason." (Page 463)
(Parr v. Zions
First National Bank, 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d 461)
(Emphasis Added)

- 9Thus the law of this state is clear that the Statute of
Limitations is not tolled by the disabillity of being a minor,
when in fact those minors have a duly appointed guardian who is
charged by the court to marshall and preserve all of the assets
of said minors•

If for no other reason than the existence of a

validly appointed guardian, the defendantsf mortgage should
not have been allowed to be foreclosed algainst the subject property
If the guardian acted improperly, the redress of the defendants
should be against the guardian and her bond or sureties, but
should not be against the subject property.

To allow such a

foreclosure would be in derogation of ttje Statute of Limitations
as the same have uniformly been applied by this court in all
other cases.
While the natural tendency for all of us might be to not
expect a child to pursue claims against his or her parent, or a
parent to sue him or herself for misconduct, nevertheless, in
this fact situation, it should be the c4se and the defendants
had no trouble naming their mother as a counter-defendant in
their counterclaim herein.

It should nbt be forgotten that it

was Ezilda Reed Hendricks who voluntarily Solicited and accepted
the responsibility to serve as the guardian of her children.

Her

appointment to so serve must be subject to all the legal rami-fications that any other appointment would be subject to.

Her

failure to commence legal action against herself to foreclose the
mortgage did not preclude those children from commencing an
action against their mother for failing to marshall and preserve
their assets as each reached their majority.

The Statute of

- 10 Limitations did not commence to run against the individual minor
as to their right to commence an action against their guardian,
in this case their mother, until three years next after the
termination of the guardianship.

(See 78-12-18 Utah Code Annotated).

Under the doctrine established in the Jenkins v. Jensen case,
(supra) this court distinctly stated that the individual minor
had the right to commence an action against his or her guardian
in the event of the failure of that guardian to protect the
rights of the minor during his or her incapacity.

It is thus

clear that the running of the Statute of Limitations against an
individual minor, when the minor has a duly appointed and constituted guardian to represent its interest, is not "tolled" in
this state.
If these minors had not in fact had a guardian, then we
would be faced with an entirely different fact situation and the
running of the Statute of Limitations would have been argued from
an entirely different point of view.

As mentioned above, any

action by a minor, even against his guardian, for the recovery of
any property that the guardian may have disposed of improperly,
must be commenced within three years of the date of the termination of the guardianship.
Title 75-13-14 of the Utah Code Annotated provides how the
termination of guardianship is brought about.

Provisions of that

section are as follows:
"The power of a guardian of a minor shall be
terminated: First, by order of the court;
Second, by the wards obtaining majority; Third,
by the marriage of the ward; provided, that the
guardianship of the estate of the ward may be
continued at the discretion of the court after

-lithe guardianship of his person! has been terminated
by marriage, and until he reached the age of majority."
(Emphasis added)
Inasmuch as Ezilda Hendricks did not terminate the guardianship by court action, it would thus seem that the second provision of Title 75-13-14 would apply, namely, that the guardianship was terminated by the ward obtaining his or her majority.
By stipulation it is agreed that the youngest of the Reed children reached their majority on June 15, 1970. Under the provisions
of the code, a minor has three years after reaching his majority
within which to commence an action to recover any estate sold
by the guardian.

If no action is commenced, then the minor is

barred*
The plaintiff commenced this action in February of 19 73.

On

February 26, 1973, the defendants1 attorney, Parker M. Nelson,
answered plaintiff's complaint by denying the material allegations
of the same and alleging simply that the mortgage was valid.
There is nothing in the Statutes of the state of Utah nor in any
of the decisions of this court that appellants have been able to
find, which would construe that an answer of a defendant to be
the same as the commencement of an action.

In fact, Rule 3 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure indicates that an action may be
commenced in one of two ways:
court; or 2.

1.

By-filing a complaint with the

By the service of a summons.

neither of these.

The defendants did

However, the filing tyf a compulsory counter-

claim could be construed to be a commencement of an action,
especially in the light of this particular lawsuit.

The defen-

dants were required to file their counterclaim or be forever

- 12 barred (See Rule 13 URCP).

The defendants did not even attempt

to file a counterclaim herein until on or about the 19th day of
March, 1974, which was immediately prior to the first scheduled
txial in this matter on March 27, 1974.

Only after that date did

the court grant the defendants leave to file their counterclaim.
The youngest defendant reached her majority in June, 19 70, and thus
the Statute of Limitations as to her claims expired no later than
June, 1973.

Thus, by March, 1974, the fact is that the claim

upon which that counterclaim was based was then barred by the
Statute of Limitations.

The plaintiff-appellants did properly

assert that defense in their answer to defendants1 counterclaim.
The plaintiff-appellants thus conclude that in March, 1974, when
the defendants filed their counterclaim, the defendants1 right to
enforce or foreclose their mortgage was extinguished by the
running of another provision of the Statute of Limitations.

The

lower court apparently discarded all claims by the plaintiffappellants to the use of the Statute of Limitations as a bar to
the foreclosure of the subject property.
understand.

This is difficult to

This court has specifically held that a junior

mortgagee or grantee may invoke the protections of the Statute of
Limitations relative to 78-12-23, which is the applicable section
herein, when the Statute of Limitations has run against the prior
grantee or mortgagee (See Krompton v. Jensen 78 U. 55, 65, 1 P.2d
242; Boucofski v. Jacobson, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 and Graves v.
Seifried, 31 Utah 203, 87 P. 674). In the Boucofski v. Jacobson
(supra), this court held as follows:

- 13 "That the bar of the Statute mdy be invoked by the
subsequent grantee or junior lien claimant in all cases
when the bar could be invoked by the debtor unless the
subsequent grantee has by agreement or otherwise
estopped himself; that such grantee or claimant may
also envoke the bar in case the senior claimant has
had either actual or constructive notice of the subsequent grant or lien while the right of action may
still be alive as against the debtor, provided the
full period of time required by the Statute has elapsed
since the interest of the subsequent grantee or lien
holder was acquired and the senior claimant has either
actual or constructive notice of such interest for
that period of time; that in case such interest be
acquired before the original debt matured, the statute
in favor of the junior claimant^ begins to run from
the time the right of action against the original
debtor accrued,(Page 122)(fimphasis added).
". . . If the right of action lias thus accrued
against the debtor, the action must be commenced
within the six years from the time such interest
was acquired if the prior c laiijiant had notice of it
or within six years after such notice is acquired
and if not so commenced, the s itibsequent claimant
may invoke the bar of the Statute to the full extent
of that interest; and,if he h^s acquired the equity
of redemption from the origina mortgagor, or in
some other way has succeeded tcb the title, he may
protect this title," (Pages ±1 3-124) (Emphasis added)
"Appellants therefore have the I full statutory period
namely six years, from the time the cause of action
accrued, within which to commence an action to foreclose the mortgage, and if not within that time, the
mortgage would have been the senior lien . . . by
neglecting to institute suit, Appellants took the
chances that the interest, although only a lien when
acquired, may nevertheless ripen into a complete
title and thus constitute a bar against them, not
only so as to postpone their claim, but to prevent
its enforcement against the prpperty at all."
(Page 124)
The Boucofski case dealt with a party having a tax title to
the property in question, which tax title the court held became
paramount and superior to a mortgage of record at the time the
tax title was acquired.

The law announced in the Boucofski case

is still good law and it fits on all foujrs with the facts of this

- 14 case, namely, that the court found that those who acquired a
subsequent interest or title to the land would be able to use the
defense of the running of the Statute of Limitations to bar the
enforcement and foreclosure of a mortgage existing when they
secured their title to the same.
In Graves v. Seifried, (supra) this court reached a decision
similar to that in the Boucofski case when it quoted approvingly
from a decision in California as follows:
"'But it is a settled doctrine of this court, as
will be seen from the authorities above cited, that
when third persons have subsequently acquired interest
in the property, they may invoke the aide of the
statute as against the mortgagee even though the
mortgagor, as between himself and the mortgagee, may
have waived this protection; and we see no difference
in the principal between a suspension of the running
of the statute resulting from an express waiver, and
one caused by his voluntary act in absenting himself
from the state1. Under a review of the cases, the
court further observes: 'The theory of all the
cases above cited is, that while the general rule
is that a plea of the statute of limitations is a
personal privilege, the rule does not extend to
subsequent property owners over which he has no control. ' Brandstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 229, 73 Pac.
744."
A similar result was reached in the case of Bracklein v.
Realty Ins. Co., '95 U. 490, 80 P.2d 471, where the court held
that even the purchaser of the mortgaged premises who assumed and
agreed to pay the mortgage, could assert the running of the
Statute of Limitations as a defense to a mortgage foreclosure.
These decisions, while old, are still the case law in the state
of Utah and no contrary decisions are to be found.
The plaintiff-appellants urge that this court hold that the
Statute of Limitations is a bar to the enforcement and fore-

- 15 closure of defendants' mortgage against the subject property,
thereby decreeing the same to be unenforceable, barred and
extinguished.

POINT IV
THE INTEREST OF EACH OF THE DEFENDANTS*IN AND TO THE
MORTGAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED OR SEVERABLE.
At the time of the trial, the trial| court correctly entered
the defaults of three of the defendants, namely, Stuart Reed,
Russell Reed and Donald Reed, each of whbm had failed to appear
or answer plaintiff's complaint.

The legal effect of said default

would be to serve as a bar to any recovery by said defendants,
or to extinguish their rights to the mortgage in question.

A

casual examination of the mortgage in question indicates that
each of the defendants, both those appearing and those not
appearing, had made separate contributions to the alleged mortgage.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the

alleged mortgage could not have been foreclosed as to each of the
defendants as each of them reached theirl majority.

In fact,

since a specific amount is specified as [to each of the defendants,
then each of the defendants should have been entitled to foreclose the mortgage for that amount and for no more.
above, the mortgage was due on demand.

As discussed

Under the provisions of

Titles 78-12-18 and 75-13-14, U.C.A., the interest of the individual defendants, not only in this mortgage, but in any other
matter, would have been subject to the Running of the Statute of
Limitations as each of the defendants reached their majority.
Surely, the separate contributions of each defendant to the

- 16 mortgage principal was severable from the contributions of the
other defendants.

In Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. 117,

this court held that in an adverse possession action, where there
was no guardian for the minors involved, that the Statute of
Limitations had run against those minors who had reached their
majority, but had not run as to those who had not reached their
majority.

This court thus acknowledged the severability of the

claims of minors, as they reach their majority.
As the guardian of the estates of the defendants when they
were minors, Ezilda Hendricks had no responsibility to marshall
the assets of one minor for the benefit of another minor.

Her

only duty was to marshall the assets of each of the minor defendants for their private and personal benefit.

Each of the indi-

vidual defendants made a contribution to the consideration
received for the mortgage and each of them at one time had a
right to the recovery of that consideration.

However, surely the

older defendants are not to be allowed, by any stretch of the
imagination or implication of law, to "toll" the running of the
Statute of Limitations as.to them, until the youngest of their
brothers and sisters became of age. Any disability that the law
may have given the defendants as minors was removed by the
appointment of a guardian for said defendants.

Their guardian

had the affirmative duty to foreclose said mortgage within six
years after the mortgage was reasonably due.

Since their guardian

failed to foreclose said mortgage within the time allowed, the
defendants are now barred under the ruling in Jenkins v. Jensen,
Dignan v. Nelson and Parr v. Zions First National Bank (supra)

- 17 from any right of foreclosure herein, whether severable or joint,
Furthermore, the trial court, by granting the defendants a
foreclosure of the entire amount of the original mortgage, in
effect set aside the default of the thre^ defendants who did not
appear, nor file a counterclaim for foreclosure, because there
was no way the sum due on the mortgage could be $15,750.00,
without including the contributions of the three defaulted and
non-counterclaiming defendants.

The three defendants who did

not appear, were "deemed, by law to have admitted plaintiff's
complaint.

Legally, therefore, the mortgage, with a specified

amount of contribution from each of them, must have been satisfied
as to the non-appearing defendants, suggesting again the severability of the mortgage as between each of the defendants.

Had

the mortgage in question only specified a lump sum due, without
specifying the contributions of any of tne defendants, we might
have a different conclusion to reach relative to severability of
the mortgage and the amounts due thereunder the defendants. However, because:

(1) There was a specified contribution as to

each of the defendants; (2> This court held in Baker v. Goodman
(supra) that the Statute of Limitations is not "tolled" for the
older brothers and sisters until the youngest child reaches his
or her majority; (3) More than a reasonable time (seventeen years)
to foreclose the mortgage had run; (4) The defendants, while
under the disability of being minors had a duly constituted
and appointed guardian who was charged with marshalling all assets
of the minors; and (5) The Statute of Limitations does run
against minors who have a duly constituted and appointed guardian,

- 18 the plaintiff-appellants would urge but one conclusion, namely,
that the mortgage was severable as between the individual defendants, as well as being barred by the Statute of Limitations.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the plaintiff-appellants
would urge this court to reverse the decision of the lower court
granting the foreclosure of the defendants• mortgage against the
subject property, the same being unenforceable and barred by the
Statute of Limitations, or in the alternative, and in the event
the foregoing should fail, to reverse the lower court, and to
reduce the judgment of foreclosure by the amount contributed by
the three defendants who were in default, together with any and
all other defendants this court finds who were barred, by operation
of law from enforcing their portion of the mortgage.
tespecfc^lmfc submitted,
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